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by Katy Jacob, policy research specialist, Financial Markets Group, Carrie Jankowski, business economist, Financial Markets Group,  
and Anna Lunn, associate economist, Financial Markets Group
As consumers and merchants increasingly adopt electronic payments, the pricing of 
these services has generated substantial scrutiny by public authorities around the world. 
To discuss these developments and related issues, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
hosted its ninth annual Payments Conference on May 14–15, 2009.
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For some time now, merchants have spo-
ken out about their inability to inﬂ  uence 
their customers’ payment choice or to 
pass along the costs of payment instru-
ments such as credit cards to their cus-
tomers. The card networks, such as Visa 
and MasterCard, have received the brunt 
of the pricing criticism across the globe 
as public authorities seek to restructure 
payment costs. Yet, the networks argue 
that the fees they charge reﬂ  ect the mar-
ket value of their products. Consumer 
advocates often claim that consumers are 
unaware of the impact of their payment 
decisions and that some consumers end 
up subsidizing the payment choices of 
others. Adding to the mix, many non-
bank payment providers are bringing 
innovative payment products to the 
market to satisfy changing consumer 
and merchant preferences and needs. 
In an efﬁ  cient market, prices and beneﬁ  ts 
are aligned in a way that provides all par-
ticipants with proper incentives to max-
imize social welfare.1 If the costs and 
beneﬁ  ts of the payments system are not 
aligned in such a way, will regulation be re-
quired to bring the system into the proper 
balance? Or will the market resolve the 
problem through innovation? In this 
Chicago Fed Letter, we summarize this year’s 
Payments Conference, where the partici-
pants discussed these and related issues.
The current environment
In his keynote address, David Stewart, of 
McKinsey and Company, described how 
the weakened U.S. economy and grow-
ing regulatory pressures are inﬂ  uencing 
the payments landscape. Payments rev-
enues saw a 5.9% compounded annual 
growth rate over the period 2002–07, 
according to Stewart, but in the next ﬁ  ve 
years, this growth may slow to 1.3%. Such 
a decline might be expected in a size-
able downturn, but there are particular 
factors in play this time that suggest the 
impact might be felt differently by dif-
ferent players. Deposit balances were the 
highest ever in 2008, Stewart said, as 
people cut back on consumption; and 
the supply of credit also diminished great-
ly, since risk aversion increased through-
out the market. Debit card usage was 
growing much more rapidly than credit 
card usage before the downturn, and 
current conditions may bolster this trend. 
Furthermore, with consumer spending 
weakening, merchants may attempt to re-
duce costs by steering consumers toward 
payment types with lower merchant fees. 
In addition to such pressures, pricing 
practices for payment products are be-
coming increasingly scrutinized by public 
authorities globally. Financial institutions 
are now struggling to ﬁ  nd pricing models 
that replace their reliance on traditional It is hard to engage consumers in the pricing debate because 
they typically do not see the costs imposed on others by their 
payment choices.
sources of revenue, such as interchange 
fees2 from merchants and penalty fees 
from some consumers, including over-
draft fees3 and ﬁ  nance charges on credit 
cards. Penalties currently make up a 
large portion of the consumer revenue 
stream from payment products as a re-
sult of competitive developments in the 
payments space. Forty years ago, when 
checks were the primary noncash pay-
ment instrument, consumers paid for 
them, explained Richard Oliver, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta. This model 
gave way to differential pricing based 
on minimum balances, which rewarded 
consumers who kept more money in 
their accounts. Once that model became 
ubiquitous, ﬁ  nancial institutions intro-
duced today’s indirect pricing model, 
which removed upfront fees (e.g., free 
checking and no annual fees on credit 
cards), to retain customers, according 
to Oliver. But this model is difﬁ  cult to 
sustain, since it effectively shields many 
consumers from the consequences of 
their payment choices while adversely 
affecting others. 
The debate over pricing issues
The two-sided4 nature of payment prod-
ucts makes it difﬁ  cult to determine wheth-
er the costs of such products are being 
properly distributed to promote social 
welfare. Duncan Douglass, of Alston and 
Bird LLP, described several components 
of this market, such as consumer protec-
tion and fraud prevention, whose costs 
are particularly hard to deﬁ  ne and thus 
correctly allocate. Eric Grover, Intrepid 
Ventures, pointed out that asymmetric 
pricing often is needed in two-sided mar-
kets to get both sides on board. While 
this may be ultimately the case, this im-
balance fuels the perception that certain 
participants are bearing a disproportion-
ate share of the cost.
Merchants complained about the lack of 
transparency in the fee-setting methods 
for certain payment products, as well as 
the sheer complexity of the fee schedules; 
many questioned whether the costs jus-
tify the beneﬁ  ts they receive for accept-
ing these products. Dwaine Kimmet, 
The Home Depot, pointed out that in-
terchange fees are his company’s third 
largest operating cost, even larger than 
its costs for health care. Josh Peirez, 
MasterCard Worldwide, argued that the 
pricing of payment products is just like 
the pricing of any other product; prices 
are set to maximize the throughput over 
the network. Peirez argued that the bene-
ﬁ  ts merchants receive by accepting credit 
cards, such as guaranteed credit, far 
exceed the interchange fees. Mallory 
Duncan, National Retail Federation,5 dis-
agreed, suggesting that the high fees and 
complex rules of card payments add fric-
tion to doing business rather than facil-
itating it. For example, Duncan said single 
entity rules require merchants to make 
payment acceptance decisions uniform 
across all their locations, forbidding any 
local ﬂ  exibility. Moreover, the general 
consensus among merchants is that they 
have little or no recourse when it comes 
to challenging the interchange fees and 
rules set by the card networks. Instead 
of competing for merchant participation, 
these networks bid for consumers using 
merchants’ money, argued Michael A. Cook, 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
Some merchants contended that the ten-
sion between merchants and card net-
works over fees and rules hampers their 
own ability to design pricing strategies 
that properly reﬂ  ect these costs. Wendy 
Sutton, The TJX Companies, noted that 
when the price of a particular payment 
product goes up, passing the cost on to 
the consumer through higher merchan-
dise prices is not always an option. In 
addition, the general complexity of pay-
ments pricing makes merchants reluctant 
to adopt explicit pricing for different pay-
ment mechanisms. As a result of uniform 
pricing for all payment types from the 
consumer standpoint, Adam Levitin, 
Georgetown University Law Center, and 
Jean Ann Fox, Consumer Federation of 
America, argued that consumers who use 
lower-cost payment types, such as cash or 
entry-level credit cards without rewards, 
subsidize others by bearing a dispropor-
tionate share of payment costs. Cook 
stated that, as consumers move toward 
more expensive electronic payments and 
away from cash and checks, they do not 
see the impact of this switch. Because 
generally the pricing of payment prod-
ucts is not explicit, this makes it difﬁ  cult 
to engage consumers in the pricing de-
bate. Stewart countered that recent 
McKinsey research reveals that merchants’ 
preferences were quite effective in in-
ﬂ  uencing consumers’ choices. 
While much of the discussion revolved 
around the expense of electronic payment 
instruments, particularly credit cards, it 
also revealed that the costs of some tra-
ditional paper-based payment products, 
such as cash and check, may actually be 
harder to quantify. Several conference 
participants argued that cash is cheaper 
for various constituents, but others sug-
gested that this is only because cash is sub-
sidized.6 Tom Brown, of O’Melveny and 
Myers LLP, pointed out that even the 
U.S. Treasury Department claims there 
are cost savings for the U.S. as we move 
from paper-based payments (e.g., checks) 
to electronic payments. This example 
complicates the case made by merchants 
for charging their customers different 
prices based on their payment choice.
Responses to pricing issues: 
Regulation 
Conference participants debated the role 
of public authorities in regulating the 
pricing of payment products. Jean Allix, 
European Commission (EC), remarked 
that ideally it should not be up to one 
entity to decide which payment forms 
are most effective; rather, society as a 
whole must determine the beneﬁ  ts of 
different types of payments through a 
democratic process. While this is an 
admirable goal, it is difﬁ  cult to achieve 
in practice. Consequently, several foreign 
authorities have intervened directly in 
the market for payment card services. 
Within the past ﬁ  ve years, the EC, Reserve 
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México have opted for regulation to 
promote market efﬁ  ciency. John Simon, 
Reserve Bank of Australia, described how 
the RBA prohibited “no surcharge” rules 
and narrowed interchange fee differen-
tials between card payments systems. In 
the European Economic Area (EEA),7 
MasterCard lowered its multilateral inter-
change fees for cross-border transactions, 
temporarily, in response to inquiries from 
the EC.8 Furthermore, Allix recounted, 
the EC now requires banks to inform 
retailers of the different costs associated 
with different cards and allows explicit 
pricing in order to increase competition 
in the EEA. According to Simon, as a 
result of the Australian reforms, price 
signals are now better at providing the 
necessary incentives to increase social 
welfare, and the narrower range of inter-
change fees better reﬂ  ects the similarities 
of the card products.9 However, since 
direct regulation is costly, the RBA is con-
sidering negotiating voluntary targets for 
interchange fees with the private sector 
or pushing the industry to ﬁ  nd a solution 
under the threat of greater regulation 
if it fails to ﬁ  nd one.  
Because the card market is less developed 
in Mexico, Banco de México encouraged 
pricing that would increase overall card 
usage, according to Jose Negrin, Banco 
de México. Banco de México allowed 
merchants to choose whether to accept 
debit, credit, or both types of cards, and 
pressured card networks to reduce inter-
change fees and adopt a fee schedule 
that encourages card acceptance by small 
merchants. The bank announced targets 
for interchange fees for the private sec-
tor, indicating regulation would follow if 
targets were not met. As a result, Negrin 
explained, the fees decreased and card 
usage and acceptance increased. 
U.S. public authorities have not regu-
lated interchange fees. Wilko Bolt, De 
Nederlandsche Bank, cautioned that be-
cause it is so difﬁ  cult to determine the true 
costs and beneﬁ  ts of payments, regula-
tory initiatives may produce unintended 
consequences. Many U.S.-based confer-
ence participants advocated a more hands- 
off approach by public authorities. Some, 
like Grover, said that direct intervention, 
such as price controls, will stiﬂ  e value 
creation. Many of those who saw a role 
for the government envisioned it more 
along the lines of removing the barriers 
that exist in the current payments mar-
ket—e.g., allowing differential pricing at 
the merchant level and leveling the bar-
gaining power of the major participants. 
Responses to pricing issues: 
Innovation 
Whether or not government regulation 
is necessary to increase social welfare, 
merchant complaints that interchange 
fees are too high and too complicated, 
as well as consumers’ fears of unpredict-
able interest rates on credit cards and 
overdrafts, provide opportunities for 
innovation. In fact, consumers are more 
willing than ever to adopt new payment 
devices that bring them increased value, 
according to Scott Grimes, Cardlytics. 
He cited the growth in online consumer-
ism, 80 million underbanked consum-
ers,10 and the mainstream transition from 
cash to debit for everyday purchases as 
opportunities for payment innovations. 
Since banking relationships are becom-
ing more multilateral and ﬁ  nancial in-
stitutions are no longer depending on 
physical locations, the industry appears 
ripe for such innovations, Grimes said.  
Moreover, Steve Mott, BetterBuyDesign, 
presented data indicating that, although 
Generation Y has not adopted online 
banking to the extent that baby boom-
ers have, the younger cohort is more 
receptive to alternative payments such 
as mobile payments and potential pay-
ment instruments in virtual social net-
works like Facebook. 
In addition to seeking out such oppor-
tunities, payment providers are targeting 
underserved markets, particularly under-
banked consumers, with products that 
offer more value to these segments than 
the status quo. Steve Streit, Green Dot 
Corp., said that prepaid cards provide 
transparency and ﬁ  nancial control be-
cause they automatically prevent consum-
ers from overspending. In the past, debit 
cards were like prepaid cards in that they 
limited spending to the available balance, 
but now debit card consumers are al-
lowed to exceed their balance (with an 
overdraft fee of up to $35). Streit said 
that because Green Dot limits spending 
to the card balance and is forthright in 
its pricing, its products attract consumers 
concerned about overspending and 
expensive debt. 
Retailers have also innovated their pay-
ments processes and offerings in order to 
reduce costs. Cook detailed how Wal-Mart 
improved the technology for cash han-
dling and used point-of-purchase (POP) 
conversion of checks into electronic pay-
ments to reduce its costs. Kimmet and 
Sutton discussed how their stores’ private 
label credit cards help them reduce their 
payments acceptance expenses while gen-
erating loyalty from their customers. 
The conference also addressed how in-
novation can build on existing systems. 
Gloria Colgan, Discover Network, de-
scribed how ﬁ  nding a new proﬁ  table bal-
ance between consumers and merchants 
can lead to a more sustainable approach. 
For example, Discover partnered with 
over 100 merchants to offer enhanced 
cash-back bonuses redeemable with 
participating merchants. According to 
Colgan, both sides need to ﬁ  nd value, or 
the market risks ending up with intrusive 
regulation. Instead of competing directly 
with legacy systems as Discover does, 
Dickson Chu, PayPal, explained how 
PayPal extends the utility of these systems. 
According to Chu, PayPal appeals to con-
sumers because it allows them to make 
fast, easy, and secure payments using their 
preferred payment method, such as a 1 Social welfare is deﬁ  ned as the sum of the 
economic surplus realized by each partic-
ipant. Economic surplus is deﬁ  ned as the 
difference between the willingness to pay 
and the price paid for the good or service.
2 Interchange fees are per debit or credit 
transaction fees paid by the merchant’s 
bank to the card network’s bank; these 
fees are typically passed on to the merchant 
via merchant discount fees. The value 
of interchange payments has become 
quite large partly because of the success 
of card payment products. This expense 
is a major source of contention between 
merchants and the credit card networks. 
3 Overdraft fees are paid by the consum-
er either as a ﬂ  at fee for overdrawing a 
checking account or as interest paid on 
the overdraft amount.
4 Two-sided markets are economic networks 
having two distinct user groups that pro-
vide each other with network beneﬁ  ts 
(e.g., credit cards with cardholders and 
merchants). For more discussion on two-
sided markets and payment networks, 
see Wilko Bolt and Sujit Chakravorti, 
2008, “Economics of payment cards: A 
status report,” Economic Perspectives, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 32, No. 4, 
Fourth Quarter, pp. 15–27.
5 The National Retail Federation represents 
1.6 million retail establishments in the 
U.S., and its members are primarily 
smaller merchants. 
6 Cash is subsidized in part by the resources 
the Federal Reserve uses in supplying 
genuine currency to ﬁ  nancial institutions 
and ultimately the general public.
7 For details on the EEA, see www.efta.int/ 
content/legal-texts/eea/EEAtext/ 
EEAagreement.
8 See a recent MasterCard Worldwide 
press release at www.mastercard.com/
us/company/en/newsroom/european_ 
commission_announcement.html, as 




9 For more details on the RBA’s review of 




10 Underbanked consumers are those who 
supplement some or many mainstream 
ﬁ  nancial services with services from alter-
native providers, such as check cashers.
debit or credit card. PayPal also provides 
smaller merchants that cannot get mer-
chant accounts at banks access to elec-
tronic payments systems. 
Innovations may also be needed to off-
set forthcoming declines in the usage of 
some legacy products. Both Mott and 
Richard Crone, of Crone Consulting 
LLC, described the opportunities that 
new technologies are providing to in-
crease the value of traditional products. 
According to Mott, many ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions have failed to embrace new tech-
nologies, such as mobile phones and 
social networks; this has allowed alterna-
tive payment providers, such as Obopay 
and PayPal, openings to the market. 
Crone touted the opportunity for ﬁ  nan-
cial institutions to get on board with 
mobile payments to reduce transaction 
costs and promote loyalty through mo-
bile self-service, payments, and banking. 
One drawback of mobile payments for 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, he warned, is that 
mobile carrier networks will naturally 
expect to receive part of the revenues.  
Conclusion
At some level, we all bear the costs of pay-
ments, Sujit Chakravorti, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, stated, but how these 
costs are passed on to consumers and mer-
chants may affect the adoption and usage 
of mature and emerging payment instru-
ments. Participants at the conference rec-
ognized that because the real beneﬁ  ts and 
real costs of payments are often hard to 
discern, efﬁ  cient pricing structures are 
naturally difﬁ  cult to deﬁ  ne. Still, given 
the weakened economy and changing 
consumer preferences, many players are 
searching for ways to lower the cost of 
payments while remaining competitive. 
Overall, participants agreed that an in-
crease in transparency in pricing would 
help the payments system to function more 
efﬁ  ciently.  This may be achieved through 
innovation—both directly, by introducing 
more-transparent products, and indirect-
ly, through the competition generated by 
these new products. However, if too many 
participants in the U.S. continue to think 
that they are being shortchanged by the 
card networks, they are likely to turn to 
the regulators and the courts to redress 
what they regard as an unacceptable im-
balance in the market.